Between 1993 and 2000, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a number of agreements that called for the transfer of power from the Israeli military and its civil administration to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was created in this context. The main agreements signed included:

- A Declaration of Principles (1993), which established the framework of the negotiations;
- The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (1994), calling for the PAs deployment in those areas;
- The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1995), which divided the West Bank (with the exception of Hebron city and East Jerusalem) into three areas: A, B and C;
- The Hebron Protocol (1997), which outlined the transfer of power in Hebron city, with delegation of powers to the PA in part of the city (H1) and ongoing Israeli military presence in the remainder (H2); and
- The Wye River Memorandum (1998), which, among other issues, called for the transfer to PA administration of some three per cent of the West Bank as a designated “nature reserve”.

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INTRODUCTION

Palestinian civilians in the occupied Palestinian territory continue to have humanitarian needs that are rooted in protection concerns related to international humanitarian and human rights law in the context of the ongoing occupation, recurrent escalations in hostilities and internal Palestinian divisions. Threats to life, liberty and security, restrictions on free movement, and the risk of forced displacement undermine the ability of up to 1.8 million Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, to live normal, self-sustaining lives. Of these, an estimated 1.26 million Palestinians are food-insecure and approximately 980,000 receive less than 60 litres of water a day.

In the Gaza Strip, the ongoing land, sea, and air blockade has continued to affect all aspects of civilian life, undermining livelihoods, entrenching poverty and impeding the development of services and infrastructure for education, healthcare and water/sanitation. While Israel has legitimate security concerns, the restrictions it imposes on the movement of people and goods to, from and within the Gaza Strip run counter to international law and amount to collective punishment. There are also concerns regarding the adherence of Palestinian armed groups to international humanitarian law, with respect to the protection of civilians in Gaza and southern Israel.

In the West Bank, continued settlement expansion and a multi-layered system of restrictions on movement and access to land and resources, planning and construction has resulted in increased fragmentation and undermined livelihoods and access to services. In Area C and East Jerusalem thousands of Palestinians remain at risk of displacement, particularly as a result of forced evictions and demolitions. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians to East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip continue to undermine access to education and specialized healthcare services. Overall, the lack of accountability for violations of human rights and humanitarian law, along with a failure to effectively enforce the rule of law, has created a climate of impunity that contributes to further violence.

PALESTINIAN REGISTERED REFUGEES

West Bank ~ 875,000 refugees
Gaza ~ 1,217,000 refugees
Lebanon ~ 466,000 refugees
Syria ~ 516,000 refugees
Jordan ~ 2 million refugees

POVERTY

39% of the population of the Gaza Strip and 17.8% of the West Bank live in poverty.

FOOD INSECURITY

33% of the population of the Gaza Strip is food insecure.

HOUSEHOLD SIZE

5.8 persons

Israelis

520,000 Israeli settlers\(^{**}\)

\(^{**}\) live in 150 settlements and 180 outposts in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in contravention of international law.

\(^{***}\) poor

\(^{****}\) c\(\ell\)/c\(\ell\) in the Gaza Strip and 100 l/c/d in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, below the WHO standard of 100 l/c/d.

\(^{**}\) 20\% unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip and 14.6 million in the West Bank.**

\(^{***}\) nearly 30% is below the age of 18.

\(^{****}\) is the average Palestinian household size in the oPt.**

\(^{*****}\) is the average water consumption in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

\(^{******}\) in the Gaza Strip.

\(^{*******}\) in the West Bank.

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\(^{********}\) of the population of the Gaza Strip and 17.8% of the West Bank live in poverty.

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\(^{***********}\) and East Jerusalem.

\(^{************}\) to further violence.
for Palestinians to access their lands.
In 1967,
**West Bank Access Restrictions December 2012**

**Betlehem Closures**
- Checkpoints: 7
- Green Line Checkpoints: 1
- Partial Checkpoints: 1
- Earthmounds: 7
- Roadblocks: 2
- Closed Road Gates: 4
- Open Road Gates: 3
- Trenches: -
- Earth Walls: 2 - 1,230 m
- Road Barriers: -
- TOTAL: 26

**Closed and Restricted Areas**
- Israeli military base
- Israeli closed military area
- Settlement built-up, water tank and municipal area
- Land cultivated by settlers
- Israeli Nature Reserve
- Other road
- Panoramic photograph
- Partial照片

**Palestinian Communities**
- Government Capital
- Governmental Boundary
- Settlements
- < 1,000 Residents
- 1,000 - 3,000
- > 3,000
- Unencumbered
- Under Construction

**Roads**
- Prohibited Palestinian vehicle use
- Main Road
- Other road
- Trenches

**OSLO INTERIM AGREEMENTS (1995-1999)**
- Area A
- Area B
- Area C
- Special Case (CP)
- Separation Barrier
- Israeli Settlement

**The Barrier in Bethlehem**

1. Complete delegation of powers to the Palestinian Authority
2. Partial delegation of powers to the Palestinian Authority; joint Israeli-Palestinian security coordination
3. Hebron Agreement
4. Very limited delegation of powers to the Palestinian Authority
H1 and H2 refer to the division of the city of Hebron into an area under the control of the PA (H1 - 80%) and another under the control of the Israeli Army (H2 - 20%) following its withdrawal in 1997.

Physical Closures

- Checkpoints
- Green Line Checkpoints
- Partial Checkpoints
- Earthmounds
- Roadblocks
- Road Gates
- Trenches
- Earth Walls
- Road Barriers
- Others

TOTAL 95

1. E.g. Barbed wire, turnstiles, iron gate, cement barriers.
2. City is based on October 2010 comprehensive field survey and bi-weekly field updates.

**OCHA**

Anas and Chaos, this is a report of December 2010, it is released by OCHA.

The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The use of the term "Israel" does not imply an official position concerning the status of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the Israeli settlements in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.

The information and views expressed in this document are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the United Nations Organization or its Member States.
**KEY FACTS**

- Over 60% of the West Bank is considered Area C, where Israel retains near exclusive control, including over law enforcement, planning and construction.
- 150,000 (approx.) Palestinians live in Area C in 542 communities, 281 of which are located entirely or mostly (50 per cent or more of their built up area) in Area C. They are among the most vulnerable of West Bank residents.
- Some 325,000 Israeli settlers live in some 135 settlements and about 100 outposts in Area C, in contravention of international law.
- Most of Area C has been allocated for the benefit of Israeli settlements, which receive preferential treatment at the expense of Palestinian communities. Palestinian construction in 70% of Area C is prohibited and in 29% it is heavily restricted; less than 1% of Area C has been planned for Palestinian development. In 2012, 540 Palestinian-owned structures in Area C, including 165 residential structures, were demolished due to lack of Israeli-issued permits, displacing 815 people, over half of them children.
- Over 70% of communities located entirely or mostly in Area C are not connected to the water network and rely on tankered water at vastly increased cost; water consumption in some of these communities is as low as 20 litres per capita per day, one-fifth of the WHO’s recommendation.
- Palestinian movement in Area C is controlled and restricted by a complex system of physical and administrative means. These include the Barrier, checkpoints, roadblocks, and a permit system, which undermine livelihoods and access to basic services.

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**Settlement Areas**  
including Local and Regional Councils

- 43% of West Bank

**Nature Reserves**  
Israeli & “Wye River Memorandum”*

- 13% of West Bank

**Closed Military Areas**  
including “firing” zones

- 20% of West Bank

**Zoning in Area C**

- **Area C**
  - Construction Prohibited: 2,451 km²
  - Construction Heavily Restricted: 1,015 km²
  - Planned for Palestinian Development: 35 km²

- 70%
- 29%
- 1%

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* Under the Wye River Memorandum of 1998, land reserves, amounting to approximately three percent of the West Bank, were supposed to be handed over to the PA to be set aside as a Green Area/Nature Reserve. To date, the PA has not been allowed to utilize this area.

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For more information, please refer to index on page 32.
The Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area covers around 30 per cent of the West Bank, and is home to nearly 60,000 Palestinians.

Most of the area is prohibited for Palestinian use, earmarked instead for the use of the Israeli military or under the jurisdiction of Israeli settlements.

Around one quarter of Palestinians in the area reside in Area C, including some 7,900 Bedouin and herders. Some 3,400 people reside partially or fully in closed military zones and face a high risk of forced displacement.

There are 37 Israeli settlements, with a population of 9,500, established across the area, in contravention of international law.

Water consumption dips to 20 litres/capita/day in most herding communities in the area, compared to the WHO recommendation of 100 l/c/d and the average settlement consumption of 300 l/c/d.

Access to the area, which has improved in the past year, is controlled by two checkpoints and two partial checkpoints, the latter of which are rarely staffed.

Restrictions on access to transportation routes, to agricultural land and to water resources have impeded Palestinian livelihoods. Meanwhile, Israeli settlements have been able to develop highly profitable agricultural, mineral, touristic and other businesses.

*For more information, please refer to index on page 32.*
The Barrier’s total length (constructed and projected) is approximately 708 km, more than twice the length of the 1949 Armistice (‘Green’) Line, which separates Israel from the occupied West Bank.

Approximately 62% of the Barrier is complete, a further 8% is under construction and 30% is planned, but not yet constructed.

When completed, some 85% of the route will run inside the West Bank, isolating some 9.4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

In 2004, the International Court of Justice established that the sections of the Barrier which run inside the West Bank violate Israel’s obligations under international law and should be dismantled.

The inclusion of Israeli settlements, including areas planned for their future expansion, on the ‘Israeli side’ of the Barrier is the single most important factor determining the route of the Barrier and its deviation from the Green Line.

The Barrier has reduced the access of around 7,500 Palestinians living in communities located behind the Barrier to workplaces and essential services. They require special permits to continue living in their homes; another 23,000 will be isolated if the Barrier is completed as planned.

There are about 150 Palestinian communities which have part of their land isolated by the Barrier and must obtain ‘visitors’ permits or perform ‘prior coordination’ to access this area.

Access to agricultural land through the Barrier is channeled through 80 gates, the majority of which only open for limited times during the olive harvest. Many applicants are refused access even then.

The Barrier has also adversely affected urban centres, particularly East Jerusalem, where it has transformed the geography, economy and social life of Palestinian residents.

For more information, please refer to index on page 12.
An existing plan to relocate around 2,300 Palestinians living in 20 small herding communities in the hills to the east of Jerusalem raises concerns about forced transfer.

Most of the communities oppose their relocation and have requested protection and assistance in their current location, including adequate planning and permits for their homes and livelihood-related properties.

The two relocation sites designated by the Israeli authorities would likely undermine the traditional culture and livelihoods of the affected communities, which require access to grazing lands to sustain their livestock.

One of the sites (next to Al Eizariya town) raises additional health concerns due to its location next to a refuse dump site.

The relocation process as a whole has failed to meet basic international standards, particularly in regard to the participation and the free and informed choice of the affected people.

Over 80% of the residents are refugees, who have not been provided with a durable solution or allowed to pursue claims for property they own in Israel.

All the communities have lost access to land due to settlement expansion, most have demolition orders pending against their homes, none has access to the electricity network and only half are connected to the water network.

Most of the affected communities in the area are located within what has become the municipal boundaries of the Ma’ale Adummim settlement, which encompass some 4,800 hectares.

Over 200 families were relocated from this area in the 1990s, some by force. Of these, more than 85% report that they had to abandon their traditional livelihoods.
KEY FACTS

- Violence by Israeli settlers undermines the physical security and livelihoods of Palestinians living under Israel’s prolonged military occupation.
- In 2012, 150 Palestinians were injured by Israeli settlers. In addition, 68 Palestinians were injured by Israeli soldiers during clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians.
- In 2012, 49 Israeli settlers were injured by Palestinians.
- In 2012, over 8,600 Palestinian-owned trees were damaged or destroyed by Israeli settlers, undermining the livelihoods of hundreds of families.
- Over 90 per cent of monitored complaints regarding settler violence filed by Palestinians with the Israeli police in recent years have been closed without indictment.
- OCHA has identified 110 communities with a combined population of over 315,000 Palestinians, who are vulnerable to settler violence, including nearly 135,000 who are at high-risk.
- Since 2008, settlers have attacked Palestinians and their property as a means of discouraging the Israeli authorities from dismantling outposts (the so-called “price tag” strategy), small “satellite” settlements built without official authorization.
- The root cause of the settler violence phenomenon is Israel’s decades-long policy of illegally facilitating the setting of its citizens inside occupied Palestinian territory.

SETTLER ATTACKS RESULTING IN PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES OR PROPERTY DAMAGE

For more information, please refer to index on page 32.
KEY FACTS

- In 2012, Palestinian children in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were significantly affected by ongoing conflict and protracted occupation. In total, 50 Palestinian children (40 boys and 10 girls) were killed and 665 injured (460 boys and 255 girls) during military operations and as a result of violence by Israeli settlers.
- In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, four Palestinian boys were killed and 552 children were injured (536 boys and 16 girls).
- In Gaza, 46 Palestinian children were killed and at least 113 injured. The main sources of killing or injury included the hostilities between Israel and Hamas in November 2012, as well injuries incurred as a result of the detonation of UXOs and demonstrations in access-restricted areas in Gaza.
- In total, 322 incidents affecting schools were documented, including 285 reported during the escalation of November 2012 in Gaza. These attacks resulted in damage to schools or interruption of education, and in some instance in direct injury of children.

AFFECTED CHILDREN

- Child killed
- Child injured
- Governorate Capital

Schools damaged or otherwise affected by violence

Green Line

including attacks on and restriction of access to schools by Israeli-settlers and ISF and schools threatened with demolition orders issued between January - December 2012

*Single children where children face delays in returning to school because of settlers or their way to and from school**

BARRIER

- Constructed / Under Construction
- Planned
- Israeli Closed Military Areas
- Israeli agricultural gate
- Israeli settlement outer limit, municipal boundary outposts and land cultivated by settlers

OSLO AGREEMENT

Area A
Area B
Area C

GAZA STRIP

- No-Go Zone (300 metres)
- Risk zone

*Children affected by violence January - December 2012. Source: OCHA PVC Database, UNOCHA

**Working Group on Grave Violations against Children

***Information obtained from the Child Protection Working Group and the Education Cluster

For more information, please refer to index on page 37.

CHILDREN AND SCHOOLS AFFECTED FROM GAZA ESCALATION 14 - 25 NOVEMBER 2012

35 Killed
289 Injured
250 Injured

conflict-related child casualties by governorate

1-25
26-75
76-200
KEY FACTS

- In 2012, more than 600 Palestinian homes and other structures were demolished by Israeli authorities, resulting in the forced displacement of 886 Palestinians, more than half of them children. Around 4,100 people were otherwise affected, for example due to the demolition of animal shelters, water cisterns or infrastructure.

- Most demolitions (90%) occur in already vulnerable farming and herding communities in Area C; thousands of others remain at-risk of demolition and displacement due to outstanding demolition orders.

- Palestinian construction in 70% of Area C is prohibited (allocated to Israeli settlements or the military) and in 29% it is heavily restricted; less than 1% of Area C has been planned for Palestinian development. Palestinians who built without Israeli permits are exposed to demolitions and displacement.

- Only 13% of East Jerusalem is zoned for Palestinian construction, much of which is already built up, compared with 35% which has been zoned for the use of Israeli settlements.

- Demolitions have serious negative consequences for Palestinian men, women and children. They often deprive Palestinians of their home and frequently result in disruption in livelihoods, reduced standard of living and limited access to basic services, with particularly negative consequences for children.

NUMBER OF DEMOLISHED PALESTINIAN OWNED STRUCTURES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE 2009 - 2012

For more information, please refer to index on page 32.

DEMOULISHED STRUCTURES

Demolitions resulting in displacement

Governorate Capital

Palestinian Built-up Areas

Green Line

Construction / Under Construction

Planned

Israeli Closed Military Area

Israeli settlement outer limit, municipal boundary, outpost and land cultivated by settlers

OLD AGREEMENT

Area A  
Area C

Area B  
"Wye River" Nature Reserves

Source: Displacement Working Group, 2012

OCHA
The chronic electricity deficit affecting Gaza over the past few years has disrupted the delivery of basic services, including water, sanitation and health, and undermined already vulnerable livelihoods and living conditions.

Electricity demand in Gaza can reach up to 360 megawatts (MW). The Gaza Power Plant (GPP) can theoretically supply 30% of this demand, while electricity purchased from Israel and Egypt can meet another 30% and 8%, respectively.

Due to fuel shortages, only a half of the GPP capacity can be utilized, exacerbating the actual deficit, and triggering scheduled blackouts of up to 12 hours a day, in addition to random unscheduled cuts. Most of the fuel used by the GPP is transferred from Egypt through the tunnels.

The generating capacity and reliability of the GPP has been significantly impaired by additional factors, including the destruction of six transformers in an Israeli airstrike in 2006; the Israeli restrictions on the import of spare parts and equipment; and the disputes between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the de-facto-authorities in Gaza.

To cope with the long blackouts, service providers and private households have resorted to back-up generators, which are unreliable due to their dependence on scarce fuel and spare parts. Private mobile generators can be particularly unsafe, environmentally polluting, and are not affordable by the poorest.

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Food security exists when people have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs.

Estimations of food security levels in the oPt are primarily based on economic access to food, which derive from food prices and household income.

Food insecurity levels are directly impacted by movement and access restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities, as well as by the levels of external assistance and extra-budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority.

By dedicating nearly half of their total cash expenditure on food, the food insecure households remain highly vulnerable to any food price increase and have limited options to cope with any decline to household incomes.

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KEY FACTS

- The MHPSS (Mental health and Psychosocial) working group, co-chaired by UNICEF and WHO, is a forum for support, mapping, referral and issues of psychosocial importance to be raised among psychosocial and mental health actors across the oPt. MHPSS working group facilitates cooperation between mental health and psychosocial actors.
- Psychosocial Support Centers are comprised of five emergency psychosocial support teams, 21 Family Centers, 15 Adolescent friendly Spaces and more than fifty community-based organizations.
- The Psychosocial Support Centers are owned by local community-based organisations to provide safe spaces for children and their caregivers, who are affected by the conflict, to receive a variety of protection services, such as psychosocial care and UXO risk education.
- Family Centers and Adolescents Friendly Spaces provide additional educational, recreational, life skills, active participation and awareness raising services to children and adolescents, which help to positively contribute towards improving their psychosocial well-being and their capacities as agents of change.
- The Centers serve around 35,000 Children and adolescents between the ages of 6-18 years and are located across the Gaza Strip, including marginalized and high risk areas, e.g. near Access Restricted Area.

For more information, please refer to index on page 35.
<table>
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<td>PCDCR</td>
<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>Beach Women's Center</td>
<td>MA'AN</td>
<td>Japan Funds</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>Al Naser Al Arab Sports Club</td>
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<td>Japan Funds</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>PCDCR</td>
<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>Economic Development for Women's Health</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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<td>PCDCR</td>
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<td>ECHO &amp; Japan</td>
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Checks

Checkpoint and partial checkpoint infrastructure is composed of two elements - an infrastructure which impedes vehicular and pedestrian traffic and permanent presence of Israeli security personnel (e.g. the IDF, the Border Police, the civil Police, a private security company). Security personnel usually check the documentation of persons crossing the checkpoint and conduct searches on their vehicles and their belongings.

Partial Checkpoints

Partial checkpoints are made up of similar infrastructure as checkpoints but are not permanently staffed. Frequently, the partial checkpoint infrastructure is installed on roadsides and, therefore, does not directly obstruct the traffic. When staffed, partial checkpoints function as the full checkpoints described above. When unstaffed, the traffic may flow relatively freely along the route.

Road Barriers

Road barriers may be composed of a fence or a concrete barrier running along the side of a road. To be classified as a road barrier, the type of infrastructure should be at least 100 metres long and obstruct free passage of people, vehicles or livestock, on, off or across the road.

Road Gates

Road gates are metal gates used to block access to a route. All road gates (including those which were open when recorded by OCHA) are marked on the maps as closures, until the infrastructure is removed.

Trenches (or ditches)

Trenches or ditches are dug across flat land or along the side of a road to prevent vehicles from going around a closure obstacle on the road.

Earthwalls

Earthwalls are concrete blocks of about one cubic meter and, like earthmounds, are constructed from one or more earthmounds along a road or track. Several mounds less than 50 meters apart, therefore, can be counted as one closure. If a mound is pushed to the side by IDF or Palestinians or if a road around it is created and vehicle access is possible, the mound is not recorded as an obstacle. Earth mounds are often removed or circumvented and then rebuilt or enlarged. Therefore, some of them appear on one map, disappear from the next and then subsequently reappear.

Roadblocks

Roadblocks are constructed from one or more concrete blocks of about one cubic meter and, like earthmounds, are used to prevent vehicle access to villages or roads. In all other respects, they are the same as earthmounds.

Earthmounds

Earthmounds are made up of similar infrastructure as checkpoints but are not permanently staffed. Frequently, the partial checkpoint infrastructure is installed on roadsides and, therefore, does not directly obstruct the traffic. When staffed, partial checkpoints function as the full checkpoints described above. When unstaffed, the traffic may flow relatively freely along the route.

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Where children face delays, harassment and/or abuse, by soldiers on their way to and from schools.

Checkpoints

Earthwalls

Earthmounds

Road Barriers

Road Gates

Trenches (or ditches)

Roadblocks

Earthmounds

Roadblocks